PKG_NAME:=haproxy
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.14
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/
--- /dev/null
+commit 14844e448b637fea2770bcb03a43a010c4c8176d
+Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
+Date: Thu Sep 27 14:55:34 2018 +0200
+
+ MINOR: threads: Make sure threads_sync_pipe is initialized before using it.
+
+ thread_want_sync() might be called before thread_sync_init() was called,
+ at least when reading the server state file, as apply_server_state() is called
+ before thread_sync_init(). So make sure the threads_sync_pipe was initialized
+ before writing to it, if it was not, there's no thread, so no need to sync
+ anything anyway, and if we don't check it we'll end up writing a 'S' on
+ stdin.
+
+ this only applies to 1.8.
+
+diff --git a/src/hathreads.c b/src/hathreads.c
+index 97ed31c5..9dba4356 100644
+--- a/src/hathreads.c
++++ b/src/hathreads.c
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ void thread_sync_io_handler(int fd)
+ #ifdef USE_THREAD
+
+ static HA_SPINLOCK_T sync_lock;
+-static int threads_sync_pipe[2];
++static int threads_sync_pipe[2] = {-1, -1};
+ static unsigned long threads_want_sync = 0;
+ volatile unsigned long threads_want_rdv_mask = 0;
+ volatile unsigned long threads_harmless_mask = 0;
+@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ void thread_want_sync()
+ if (all_threads_mask & (all_threads_mask - 1)) {
+ if (threads_want_sync & tid_bit)
+ return;
+- if (HA_ATOMIC_OR(&threads_want_sync, tid_bit) == tid_bit)
++ if (HA_ATOMIC_OR(&threads_want_sync, tid_bit) == tid_bit &&
++ threads_sync_pipe[1] != -1)
+ shut_your_big_mouth_gcc(write(threads_sync_pipe[1], "S", 1));
+ }
+ else {
--- /dev/null
+commit 18aff2297ce844362f28ea5317c289ba154bd33d
+Author: Lukas Tribus <lukas@ltri.eu>
+Date: Mon Oct 1 02:00:16 2018 +0200
+
+ DOC: clarify force-private-cache is an option
+
+ "boolean" may confuse users into thinking they need to provide
+ additional arguments, like false or true. This is a simple option
+ like many others, so lets not confuse the users with internals.
+
+ Also fixes an additional typo.
+
+ Should be backported to 1.8 and 1.7.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 2793578eaf934bbf28f742a35f3a1ae656280324)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
+index c69033b1..580194ec 100644
+--- a/doc/configuration.txt
++++ b/doc/configuration.txt
+@@ -1651,7 +1651,7 @@ tune.ssl.cachesize <number>
+ this value to 0 disables the SSL session cache.
+
+ tune.ssl.force-private-cache
+- This boolean disables SSL session cache sharing between all processes. It
++ This option disables SSL session cache sharing between all processes. It
+ should normally not be used since it will force many renegotiations due to
+ clients hitting a random process. But it may be required on some operating
+ systems where none of the SSL cache synchronization method may be used. In
+@@ -6535,7 +6535,7 @@ option smtpchk <hello> <domain>
+ yes | no | yes | yes
+ Arguments :
+ <hello> is an optional argument. It is the "hello" command to use. It can
+- be either "HELO" (for SMTP) or "EHLO" (for ESTMP). All other
++ be either "HELO" (for SMTP) or "EHLO" (for ESMTP). All other
+ values will be turned into the default command ("HELO").
+
+ <domain> is the domain name to present to the server. It may only be
--- /dev/null
+commit f6d20e718131aa2b468ff0a6c42e20c0b900e58b
+Author: Ilya Shipitsin <chipitsine@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat Sep 15 00:50:05 2018 +0500
+
+ BUG/MINOR: connection: avoid null pointer dereference in send-proxy-v2
+
+ found by coverity.
+
+ [wt: this bug was introduced by commit 404d978 ("MINOR: add ALPN
+ information to send-proxy-v2"). It might be triggered by a health
+ check on a server using ppv2 or by an applet making use of such a
+ server, if at all configurable].
+
+ This needs to be backported to 1.8.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit ca56fce8bd271928b18d38b439bd35bd273fe8d4)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/connection.c b/src/connection.c
+index 8c5af156..7403e8ae 100644
+--- a/src/connection.c
++++ b/src/connection.c
+@@ -874,6 +874,7 @@ int conn_recv_netscaler_cip(struct connection *conn, int flag)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/* Note: <remote> is explicitly allowed to be NULL */
+ int make_proxy_line(char *buf, int buf_len, struct server *srv, struct connection *remote)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+@@ -985,6 +986,7 @@ static int make_tlv(char *dest, int dest_len, char type, uint16_t length, const
+ return length + sizeof(*tlv);
+ }
+
++/* Note: <remote> is explicitly allowed to be NULL */
+ int make_proxy_line_v2(char *buf, int buf_len, struct server *srv, struct connection *remote)
+ {
+ const char pp2_signature[] = PP2_SIGNATURE;
+@@ -1060,7 +1062,7 @@ int make_proxy_line_v2(char *buf, int buf_len, struct server *srv, struct connec
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (conn_get_alpn(remote, &value, &value_len)) {
++ if (remote && conn_get_alpn(remote, &value, &value_len)) {
+ if ((buf_len - ret) < sizeof(struct tlv))
+ return 0;
+ ret += make_tlv(&buf[ret], (buf_len - ret), PP2_TYPE_ALPN, value_len, value);
--- /dev/null
+commit e725a7f9bfd8b7fe2e74c62c7c6bf2b9ebf83772
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Wed Oct 3 10:20:19 2018 +0200
+
+ BUG/MINOR: backend: check that the mux installed properly
+
+ The return value from conn_install_mux() was not checked, so if an
+ inconsistency happens in the code, or a memory allocation fails while
+ initializing the mux, we can crash while using an uninitialized mux.
+ In practice the code inconsistency does not really happen since we
+ cannot configure such a situation, except during development, but
+ the out of memory condition could definitely happen.
+
+ This should be backported to 1.8 (the code is a bit different there,
+ there are two calls to conn_install_mux()).
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 33dd4ef81245bb868b22f99b9be45d0791131eec)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/backend.c b/src/backend.c
+index 2b6167dc..fc1eac0d 100644
+--- a/src/backend.c
++++ b/src/backend.c
+@@ -1163,7 +1163,8 @@ int connect_server(struct stream *s)
+ if (srv) {
+ conn_prepare(srv_conn, protocol_by_family(srv_conn->addr.to.ss_family), srv->xprt);
+ /* XXX: Pick the right mux, when we finally have one */
+- conn_install_mux(srv_conn, &mux_pt_ops, srv_cs);
++ if (conn_install_mux(srv_conn, &mux_pt_ops, srv_cs) < 0)
++ return SF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ }
+ else if (obj_type(s->target) == OBJ_TYPE_PROXY) {
+ /* proxies exclusively run on raw_sock right now */
+@@ -1171,7 +1172,8 @@ int connect_server(struct stream *s)
+ if (!objt_cs(s->si[1].end) || !objt_cs(s->si[1].end)->conn->ctrl)
+ return SF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ /* XXX: Pick the right mux, when we finally have one */
+- conn_install_mux(srv_conn, &mux_pt_ops, srv_cs);
++ if (conn_install_mux(srv_conn, &mux_pt_ops, srv_cs) < 0)
++ return SF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+ }
+ else
+ return SF_ERR_INTERNAL; /* how did we get there ? */
--- /dev/null
+commit 45e9f3c660c872e93588cf1c0b74c192f2c8c3d5
+Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
+Date: Wed Sep 26 15:09:58 2018 +0200
+
+ BUG/MEDIUM: buffers: Make sure we don't wrap in buffer_insert_line2/replace2.
+
+ In buffer_insert_line2() and buffer_replace2(), we can't afford to wrap,
+ so don't use b_tail to check if we do, directly use b->p + b->i instead.
+
+ This should be backported to previous versions.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 363c745569b6ffd8f095d2b7758131d08aa27219)
+ Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
+
+ [cf: This patch was adapted and its commit message too. Because of the
+ refactoring of the buffer's API in 1.9, the original patch fixes same bug in
+ ci_insert_line2/b_rep_blk.]
+
+diff --git a/src/buffer.c b/src/buffer.c
+index 167b75ae..6ad38a02 100644
+--- a/src/buffer.c
++++ b/src/buffer.c
+@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int buffer_replace2(struct buffer *b, char *pos, char *end, const char *str, int
+
+ delta = len - (end - pos);
+
+- if (bi_end(b) + delta > b->data + b->size)
++ if (b->p + b->i + delta > b->data + b->size)
+ return 0; /* no space left */
+
+ if (buffer_not_empty(b) &&
+@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ int buffer_insert_line2(struct buffer *b, char *pos, const char *str, int len)
+
+ delta = len + 2;
+
+- if (bi_end(b) + delta >= b->data + b->size)
++ if (b->p + b->i + delta >= b->data + b->size)
+ return 0; /* no space left */
+
+ if (buffer_not_empty(b) &&
--- /dev/null
+commit 4be76416751aa22992a44f2f5cfdba506809fd89
+Author: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri Sep 14 11:14:21 2018 +0200
+
+ MEDIUM: ssl: add support for ciphersuites option for TLSv1.3
+
+ OpenSSL released support for TLSv1.3. It also added a separate function
+ SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites that is used to set the ciphers used in the
+ TLS 1.3 handshake. This change adds support for that new configuration
+ option by adding a ciphersuites configuration variable that works
+ essentially the same as the existing ciphers setting.
+
+ Note that it should likely be backported to 1.8 in order to ease usage
+ of the now released openssl-1.1.1.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 415150f7640b06740fa832363d186c5c6565338e)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
+index 580194ec..7a268386 100644
+--- a/doc/configuration.txt
++++ b/doc/configuration.txt
+@@ -580,8 +580,10 @@ The following keywords are supported in the "global" section :
+ - setenv
+ - stats
+ - ssl-default-bind-ciphers
++ - ssl-default-bind-ciphersuites
+ - ssl-default-bind-options
+ - ssl-default-server-ciphers
++ - ssl-default-server-ciphersuites
+ - ssl-default-server-options
+ - ssl-dh-param-file
+ - ssl-server-verify
+@@ -984,11 +986,25 @@ setenv <name> <value>
+ ssl-default-bind-ciphers <ciphers>
+ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in. It sets
+ the default string describing the list of cipher algorithms ("cipher suite")
+- that are negotiated during the SSL/TLS handshake for all "bind" lines which
+- do not explicitly define theirs. The format of the string is defined in
+- "man 1 ciphers" from OpenSSL man pages, and can be for instance a string such
+- as "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+RC4:@STRENGTH" (without quotes). Please check the
+- "bind" keyword for more information.
++ that are negotiated during the SSL/TLS handshake except for TLSv1.3 for all
++ "bind" lines which do not explicitly define theirs. The format of the string
++ is defined in "man 1 ciphers" from OpenSSL man pages, and can be for instance
++ a string such as "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+RC4:@STRENGTH" (without quotes). For
++ TLSv1.3 cipher configuration, please check the "ssl-default-bind-ciphersuites"
++ keyword. Please check the "bind" keyword for more information.
++
++ssl-default-bind-ciphersuites <ciphersuites>
++ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in and
++ OpenSSL 1.1.1 or later was used to build HAProxy. It sets the default string
++ describing the list of cipher algorithms ("cipher suite") that are negotiated
++ during the TLSv1.3 handshake for all "bind" lines which do not explicitly define
++ theirs. The format of the string is defined in
++ "man 1 ciphers" from OpenSSL man pages under the section "ciphersuites", and can
++ be for instance a string such as
++ "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
++ (without quotes). For cipher configuration for TLSv1.2 and earlier, please check
++ the "ssl-default-bind-ciphers" keyword. Please check the "bind" keyword for more
++ information.
+
+ ssl-default-bind-options [<option>]...
+ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in. It sets
+@@ -1002,10 +1018,21 @@ ssl-default-bind-options [<option>]...
+ ssl-default-server-ciphers <ciphers>
+ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in. It
+ sets the default string describing the list of cipher algorithms that are
+- negotiated during the SSL/TLS handshake with the server, for all "server"
+- lines which do not explicitly define theirs. The format of the string is
+- defined in "man 1 ciphers". Please check the "server" keyword for more
+- information.
++ negotiated during the SSL/TLS handshake except for TLSv1.3 with the server,
++ for all "server" lines which do not explicitly define theirs. The format of
++ the string is defined in "man 1 ciphers". For TLSv1.3 cipher configuration,
++ please check the "ssl-default-server-ciphersuites" keyword. Please check the
++ "server" keyword for more information.
++
++ssl-default-server-ciphersuites <ciphersuites>
++ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in and
++ OpenSSL 1.1.1 or later was used to build HAProxy. It sets the default
++ string describing the list of cipher algorithms that are negotiated during
++ the TLSv1.3 handshake with the server, for all "server" lines which do not
++ explicitly define theirs. The format of the string is defined in
++ "man 1 ciphers" under the "ciphersuites" section. For cipher configuration for
++ TLSv1.2 and earlier, please check the "ssl-default-server-ciphers" keyword.
++ Please check the "server" keyword for more information.
+
+ ssl-default-server-options [<option>]...
+ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in. It sets
+@@ -10510,13 +10537,26 @@ ca-sign-pass <passphrase>
+ ciphers <ciphers>
+ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in. It sets
+ the string describing the list of cipher algorithms ("cipher suite") that are
+- negotiated during the SSL/TLS handshake. The format of the string is defined
+- in "man 1 ciphers" from OpenSSL man pages, and can be for instance a string
+- such as "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+RC4:@STRENGTH" (without quotes).
+- Depending on the compatibility and security requirements, the list of suitable
+- ciphers depends on a variety of variables. For background information and
+- recommendations see e. g. (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)
+- and (https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/).
++ negotiated during the SSL/TLS handshake except for TLSv1.3. The format of the
++ string is defined in "man 1 ciphers" from OpenSSL man pages, and can be for
++ instance a string such as "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+RC4:@STRENGTH" (without
++ quotes). Depending on the compatibility and security requirements, the list
++ of suitable ciphers depends on a variety of variables. For background
++ information and recommendations see e.g.
++ (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS) and
++ (https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/). For TLSv1.3
++ cipher configuration, please check the "ciphersuites" keyword.
++
++ciphersuites <ciphersuites>
++ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in and
++ OpenSSL 1.1.1 or later was used to build HAProxy. It sets the string describing
++ the list of cipher algorithms ("cipher suite") that are negotiated during the
++ TLSv1.3 handshake. The format of the string is defined in "man 1 ciphers" from
++ OpenSSL man pages under the "ciphersuites" section, and can be for instance a
++ string such as
++ "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
++ (without quotes). For cipher configuration for TLSv1.2 and earlier, please check
++ the "ciphers" keyword.
+
+ crl-file <crlfile>
+ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in. It
+@@ -11226,8 +11266,9 @@ check-ssl
+ this option.
+
+ ciphers <ciphers>
+- This option sets the string describing the list of cipher algorithms that is
+- is negotiated during the SSL/TLS handshake with the server. The format of the
++ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in. This
++ option sets the string describing the list of cipher algorithms that is
++ negotiated during the SSL/TLS handshake with the server. The format of the
+ string is defined in "man 1 ciphers". When SSL is used to communicate with
+ servers on the local network, it is common to see a weaker set of algorithms
+ than what is used over the internet. Doing so reduces CPU usage on both the
+@@ -11235,6 +11276,13 @@ ciphers <ciphers>
+ Some algorithms such as RC4-SHA1 are reasonably cheap. If no security at all
+ is needed and just connectivity, using DES can be appropriate.
+
++ciphersuites <ciphersuites>
++ This setting is only available when support for OpenSSL was built in and
++ OpenSSL 1.1.1 or later was used to build HAProxy. This option sets the string
++ describing the list of cipher algorithms that is negotiated during the TLS
++ 1.3 handshake with the server. The format of the string is defined in
++ "man 1 ciphers" under the "ciphersuites" section.
++
+ cookie <value>
+ The "cookie" parameter sets the cookie value assigned to the server to
+ <value>. This value will be checked in incoming requests, and the first
+diff --git a/include/common/defaults.h b/include/common/defaults.h
+index f53c611e..a45ab0da 100644
+--- a/include/common/defaults.h
++++ b/include/common/defaults.h
+@@ -234,11 +234,21 @@
+ #define CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS NULL
+ #endif
+
++/* ciphers used as defaults on TLS 1.3 connect */
++#ifndef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES
++#define CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES NULL
++#endif
++
+ /* ciphers used as defaults on listeners */
+ #ifndef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS
+ #define LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERS NULL
+ #endif
+
++/* cipher suites used as defaults on TLS 1.3 listeners */
++#ifndef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES
++#define LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES NULL
++#endif
++
+ /* named curve used as defaults for ECDHE ciphers */
+ #ifndef ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE
+ #define ECDHE_DEFAULT_CURVE "prime256v1"
+diff --git a/include/types/listener.h b/include/types/listener.h
+index c55569cd..ea2eadb5 100644
+--- a/include/types/listener.h
++++ b/include/types/listener.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ struct ssl_bind_conf {
+ char *ca_file; /* CAfile to use on verify */
+ char *crl_file; /* CRLfile to use on verify */
+ char *ciphers; /* cipher suite to use if non-null */
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ char *ciphersuites; /* TLS 1.3 cipher suite to use if non-null */
++#endif
+ char *curves; /* curves suite to use for ECDHE */
+ char *ecdhe; /* named curve to use for ECDHE */
+ struct tls_version_filter ssl_methods; /* ssl methods */
+diff --git a/include/types/server.h b/include/types/server.h
+index fd3c8bad..79ae7b72 100644
+--- a/include/types/server.h
++++ b/include/types/server.h
+@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ struct server {
+ int allocated_size;
+ } * reused_sess;
+ char *ciphers; /* cipher suite to use if non-null */
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ char *ciphersuites; /* TLS 1.3 cipher suite to use if non-null */
++#endif
+ int options; /* ssl options */
+ int verify; /* verify method (set of SSL_VERIFY_* flags) */
+ struct tls_version_filter methods; /* ssl methods */
+diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
+index 842e4149..4941bd03 100644
+--- a/src/server.c
++++ b/src/server.c
+@@ -1380,6 +1380,10 @@ static void srv_ssl_settings_cpy(struct server *srv, struct server *src)
+ srv->ssl_ctx.verify_host = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.verify_host);
+ if (src->ssl_ctx.ciphers != NULL)
+ srv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.ciphers);
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ if (src->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites != NULL)
++ srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites);
++#endif
+ if (src->sni_expr != NULL)
+ srv->sni_expr = strdup(src->sni_expr);
+ }
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index 08fdffab..2da0df68 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ static struct {
+
+ char *listen_default_ciphers;
+ char *connect_default_ciphers;
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ char *listen_default_ciphersuites;
++ char *connect_default_ciphersuites;
++#endif
+ int listen_default_ssloptions;
+ int connect_default_ssloptions;
+ struct tls_version_filter listen_default_sslmethods;
+@@ -186,6 +190,14 @@ static struct {
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS
+ .connect_default_ciphers = CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERS,
++#endif
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++#ifdef LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES
++ .listen_default_ciphersuites = LISTEN_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES,
++#endif
++#ifdef CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES
++ .connect_default_ciphersuites = CONNECT_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES,
++#endif
+ #endif
+ .listen_default_ssloptions = BC_SSL_O_NONE,
+ .connect_default_ssloptions = SRV_SSL_O_NONE,
+@@ -3528,6 +3540,10 @@ void ssl_sock_free_ssl_conf(struct ssl_bind_conf *conf)
+ conf->crl_file = NULL;
+ free(conf->ciphers);
+ conf->ciphers = NULL;
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ free(conf->ciphersuites);
++ conf->ciphersuites = NULL;
++#endif
+ free(conf->curves);
+ conf->curves = NULL;
+ free(conf->ecdhe);
+@@ -4061,6 +4077,9 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_
+ int verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+ struct ssl_bind_conf __maybe_unused *ssl_conf_cur;
+ const char *conf_ciphers;
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ const char *conf_ciphersuites;
++#endif
+ const char *conf_curves = NULL;
+
+ if (ssl_conf) {
+@@ -4160,6 +4179,16 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf, struct ssl_bind_conf *ssl_
+ cfgerr++;
+ }
+
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ conf_ciphersuites = (ssl_conf && ssl_conf->ciphersuites) ? ssl_conf->ciphersuites : bind_conf->ssl_conf.ciphersuites;
++ if (conf_ciphersuites &&
++ !SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ctx, conf_ciphersuites)) {
++ ha_alert("Proxy '%s': unable to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites to '%s' for bind '%s' at [%s:%d].\n",
++ curproxy->id, conf_ciphersuites, bind_conf->arg, bind_conf->file, bind_conf->line);
++ cfgerr++;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ /* If tune.ssl.default-dh-param has not been set,
+ neither has ssl-default-dh-file and no static DH
+@@ -4642,6 +4671,16 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct server *srv)
+ cfgerr++;
+ }
+
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ if (srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites &&
++ !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(srv->ssl_ctx.ctx, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites)) {
++ ha_alert("Proxy '%s', server '%s' [%s:%d] : unable to set TLS 1.3 cipher suites to '%s'.\n",
++ curproxy->id, srv->id,
++ srv->conf.file, srv->conf.line, srv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites);
++ cfgerr++;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ return cfgerr;
+ }
+
+@@ -7101,6 +7140,26 @@ static int bind_parse_ciphers(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct
+ {
+ return ssl_bind_parse_ciphers(args, cur_arg, px, &conf->ssl_conf, err);
+ }
++
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++/* parse the "ciphersuites" bind keyword */
++static int ssl_bind_parse_ciphersuites(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct ssl_bind_conf *conf, char **err)
++{
++ if (!*args[cur_arg + 1]) {
++ memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing cipher suite", args[cur_arg]);
++ return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
++ }
++
++ free(conf->ciphersuites);
++ conf->ciphersuites = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]);
++ return 0;
++}
++static int bind_parse_ciphersuites(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
++{
++ return ssl_bind_parse_ciphersuites(args, cur_arg, px, &conf->ssl_conf, err);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* parse the "crt" bind keyword */
+ static int bind_parse_crt(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bind_conf *conf, char **err)
+ {
+@@ -7492,6 +7551,10 @@ static int bind_parse_ssl(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct bin
+
+ if (global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers && !conf->ssl_conf.ciphers)
+ conf->ssl_conf.ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers);
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ if (global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites && !conf->ssl_conf.ciphersuites)
++ conf->ssl_conf.ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites);
++#endif
+ conf->ssl_options |= global_ssl.listen_default_ssloptions;
+ conf->ssl_conf.ssl_methods.flags |= global_ssl.listen_default_sslmethods.flags;
+ if (!conf->ssl_conf.ssl_methods.min)
+@@ -7689,6 +7752,10 @@ static int srv_parse_check_ssl(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, stru
+ newsrv->check.use_ssl = 1;
+ if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers && !newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers)
+ newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers);
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites && !newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites)
++ newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites);
++#endif
+ newsrv->ssl_ctx.options |= global_ssl.connect_default_ssloptions;
+ newsrv->ssl_ctx.methods.flags |= global_ssl.connect_default_sslmethods.flags;
+ if (!newsrv->ssl_ctx.methods.min)
+@@ -7712,6 +7779,21 @@ static int srv_parse_ciphers(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++/* parse the "ciphersuites" server keyword */
++static int srv_parse_ciphersuites(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
++{
++ if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) {
++ memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing cipher suite", args[*cur_arg]);
++ return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
++ }
++
++ free(newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites);
++ newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites = strdup(args[*cur_arg + 1]);
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* parse the "crl-file" server keyword */
+ static int srv_parse_crl_file(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
+ {
+@@ -7853,6 +7935,10 @@ static int srv_parse_ssl(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct ser
+ newsrv->use_ssl = 1;
+ if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers && !newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers)
+ newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers);
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites && !newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites)
++ newsrv->ssl_ctx.ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites);
++#endif
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -8092,6 +8178,32 @@ static int ssl_parse_global_ciphers(char **args, int section_type, struct proxy
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++/* parse the "ssl-default-bind-ciphersuites" / "ssl-default-server-ciphersuites" keywords
++ * in global section. Returns <0 on alert, >0 on warning, 0 on success.
++ */
++static int ssl_parse_global_ciphersuites(char **args, int section_type, struct proxy *curpx,
++ struct proxy *defpx, const char *file, int line,
++ char **err)
++{
++ char **target;
++
++ target = (args[0][12] == 'b') ? &global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites : &global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites;
++
++ if (too_many_args(1, args, err, NULL))
++ return -1;
++
++ if (*(args[1]) == 0) {
++ memprintf(err, "global statement '%s' expects a cipher suite as an argument.", args[0]);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ free(*target);
++ *target = strdup(args[1]);
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* parse various global tune.ssl settings consisting in positive integers.
+ * Returns <0 on alert, >0 on warning, 0 on success.
+ */
+@@ -8599,6 +8711,9 @@ static struct ssl_bind_kw ssl_bind_kws[] = {
+ { "alpn", ssl_bind_parse_alpn, 1 }, /* set ALPN supported protocols */
+ { "ca-file", ssl_bind_parse_ca_file, 1 }, /* set CAfile to process verify on client cert */
+ { "ciphers", ssl_bind_parse_ciphers, 1 }, /* set SSL cipher suite */
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ { "ciphersuites", ssl_bind_parse_ciphersuites, 1 }, /* set TLS 1.3 cipher suite */
++#endif
+ { "crl-file", ssl_bind_parse_crl_file, 1 }, /* set certificat revocation list file use on client cert verify */
+ { "curves", ssl_bind_parse_curves, 1 }, /* set SSL curve suite */
+ { "ecdhe", ssl_bind_parse_ecdhe, 1 }, /* defines named curve for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman */
+@@ -8618,6 +8733,9 @@ static struct bind_kw_list bind_kws = { "SSL", { }, {
+ { "ca-sign-file", bind_parse_ca_sign_file, 1 }, /* set CAFile used to generate and sign server certs */
+ { "ca-sign-pass", bind_parse_ca_sign_pass, 1 }, /* set CAKey passphrase */
+ { "ciphers", bind_parse_ciphers, 1 }, /* set SSL cipher suite */
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ { "ciphersuites", bind_parse_ciphersuites, 1 }, /* set TLS 1.3 cipher suite */
++#endif
+ { "crl-file", bind_parse_crl_file, 1 }, /* set certificat revocation list file use on client cert verify */
+ { "crt", bind_parse_crt, 1 }, /* load SSL certificates from this location */
+ { "crt-ignore-err", bind_parse_ignore_err, 1 }, /* set error IDs to ingore on verify depth == 0 */
+@@ -8661,6 +8779,9 @@ static struct srv_kw_list srv_kws = { "SSL", { }, {
+ { "check-sni", srv_parse_check_sni, 1, 1 }, /* set SNI */
+ { "check-ssl", srv_parse_check_ssl, 0, 1 }, /* enable SSL for health checks */
+ { "ciphers", srv_parse_ciphers, 1, 1 }, /* select the cipher suite */
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ { "ciphersuites", srv_parse_ciphersuites, 1, 1 }, /* select the cipher suite */
++#endif
+ { "crl-file", srv_parse_crl_file, 1, 1 }, /* set certificate revocation list file use on server cert verify */
+ { "crt", srv_parse_crt, 1, 1 }, /* set client certificate */
+ { "force-sslv3", srv_parse_tls_method_options, 0, 1 }, /* force SSLv3 */
+@@ -8716,6 +8837,10 @@ static struct cfg_kw_list cfg_kws = {ILH, {
+ { CFG_GLOBAL, "tune.ssl.capture-cipherlist-size", ssl_parse_global_capture_cipherlist },
+ { CFG_GLOBAL, "ssl-default-bind-ciphers", ssl_parse_global_ciphers },
+ { CFG_GLOBAL, "ssl-default-server-ciphers", ssl_parse_global_ciphers },
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ { CFG_GLOBAL, "ssl-default-bind-ciphersuites", ssl_parse_global_ciphersuites },
++ { CFG_GLOBAL, "ssl-default-server-ciphersuites", ssl_parse_global_ciphersuites },
++#endif
+ { 0, NULL, NULL },
+ }};
+
+@@ -8793,6 +8918,12 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
+ global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.listen_default_ciphers);
+ if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers)
+ global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphers);
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++ if (global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites)
++ global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.listen_default_ciphersuites);
++ if (global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites)
++ global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites = strdup(global_ssl.connect_default_ciphersuites);
++#endif
+
+ xprt_register(XPRT_SSL, &ssl_sock);
+ SSL_library_init();
--- /dev/null
+commit 30ba96df349ace825749a57490defeb50001a550
+Author: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
+Date: Wed Oct 10 14:51:02 2018 +0200
+
+ BUG/MEDIUM: Cur/CumSslConns counters not threadsafe.
+
+ CurSslConns inc/dec operations are not threadsafe. The unsigned CurSslConns
+ counter can wrap to a negative value. So we could notice connection rejects
+ because of MaxSslConns limit artificially exceeded.
+
+ CumSslConns inc operation are also not threadsafe so we could miss
+ some connections and show inconsistenties values compared to CumConns.
+
+ This fix should be backported to v1.8.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 7ad43e7928c9a61b40332e4d5e9a7ccc33e6b65b)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index 2da0df68..6eed8022 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static void ssl_async_fd_free(int fd)
+
+ /* Now we can safely call SSL_free, no more pending job in engines */
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+- sslconns--;
++ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&sslconns, 1);
+ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&jobs, 1);
+ }
+ /*
+@@ -5011,8 +5011,8 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ /* leave init state and start handshake */
+ conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
+
+- sslconns++;
+- totalsslconns++;
++ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sslconns, 1);
++ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&totalsslconns, 1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (objt_listener(conn->target)) {
+@@ -5062,8 +5062,8 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ conn->flags |= CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS;
+ #endif
+
+- sslconns++;
+- totalsslconns++;
++ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sslconns, 1);
++ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&totalsslconns, 1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* don't know how to handle such a target */
+@@ -5713,7 +5713,7 @@ static void ssl_sock_close(struct connection *conn) {
+ #endif
+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
+- sslconns--;
++ HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&sslconns, 1);
+ }
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+commit 8a6c4ff3f407b916bc08da4e76ed7813768ac937
+Author: mildis <me@mildis.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 2 16:46:34 2018 +0200
+
+ BUG/MINOR: checks: queues null-deref
+
+ queues can be null if calloc() failed.
+ Bypass free* calls when calloc did fail.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 5ab01cb01114065a3573570a48e84815e751bf14)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c
+index 098ddecf..74958b2d 100644
+--- a/src/checks.c
++++ b/src/checks.c
+@@ -3182,7 +3182,7 @@ int init_email_alert(struct mailers *mls, struct proxy *p, char **err)
+
+ if ((queues = calloc(mls->count, sizeof(*queues))) == NULL) {
+ memprintf(err, "out of memory while allocating mailer alerts queues");
+- goto error;
++ goto fail_no_queue;
+ }
+
+ for (mailer = mls->mailer_list; mailer; i++, mailer = mailer->next) {
+@@ -3239,6 +3239,7 @@ int init_email_alert(struct mailers *mls, struct proxy *p, char **err)
+ free_check(check);
+ }
+ free(queues);
++ fail_no_queue:
+ return 1;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+commit df4822ea169adc5c7c987fa077438f0ded1ac39b
+Author: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 15:27:07 2018 +0200
+
+ BUG/MEDIUM: mworker: segfault receiving SIGUSR1 followed by SIGTERM.
+
+ This bug appeared only if nbthread > 1. Handling the pipe with the
+ master, multiple threads of the same worker could process the deinit().
+
+ In addition, deinit() was called while some other threads were still
+ performing some tasks.
+
+ This patch assign the handler of the pipe with master to only the first
+ thread and removes the call to deinit() before exiting with an error.
+
+ This patch should be backported in v1.8.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit c8c0ed91cb4436491efd2ce2c4b4b1694aeeccca)
+ [wt: adjusted context]
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/haproxy.c b/src/haproxy.c
+index e0186ff9..1959dd0f 100644
+--- a/src/haproxy.c
++++ b/src/haproxy.c
+@@ -2349,7 +2349,13 @@ void mworker_pipe_handler(int fd)
+ break;
+ }
+
+- deinit();
++ /* At this step the master is down before
++ * this worker perform a 'normal' exit.
++ * So we want to exit with an error but
++ * other threads could currently process
++ * some stuff so we can't perform a clean
++ * deinit().
++ */
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+@@ -2364,7 +2370,10 @@ void mworker_pipe_register()
+ fcntl(mworker_pipe[0], F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+ fdtab[mworker_pipe[0]].owner = mworker_pipe;
+ fdtab[mworker_pipe[0]].iocb = mworker_pipe_handler;
+- fd_insert(mworker_pipe[0], MAX_THREADS_MASK);
++ /* In multi-tread, we need only one thread to process
++ * events on the pipe with master
++ */
++ fd_insert(mworker_pipe[0], 1);
+ fd_want_recv(mworker_pipe[0]);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+commit 4bf6d76a22b9b601fd57df4aa0f4fba62733cb07
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Mon Oct 15 11:08:55 2018 +0200
+
+ BUG/MEDIUM: stream: don't crash on out-of-memory
+
+ In case pool_alloc() fails in stream_new(), we try to detach the stream
+ from the list before it has been added, dereferencing a NULL. In order
+ to fix it, simply move the LIST_DEL call upwards.
+
+ This must be backported to 1.8.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit e5f229e6392fd54aaba7fe58f457723c16b9d15f)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/stream.c b/src/stream.c
+index 11c9dbf3..ef7cff5c 100644
+--- a/src/stream.c
++++ b/src/stream.c
+@@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ struct stream *stream_new(struct session *sess, enum obj_type *origin)
+ out_fail_accept:
+ flt_stream_release(s, 0);
+ task_free(t);
+- out_fail_alloc:
+ LIST_DEL(&s->list);
++ out_fail_alloc:
+ pool_free(pool_head_stream, s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+commit d332b12b262ad7df1c8bdda52dad100f40399d24
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Mon Oct 15 11:01:59 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: ssl: fix null-deref warning in ssl_fc_cipherlist_str sample fetch
+
+ Gcc 6.4 detects a potential null-deref warning in smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cl_str().
+ This one is not real since already addressed a few lines above. Let's use
+ __objt_conn() instead of objt_conn() to avoid the extra test that confuses
+ it.
+
+ This could be backported to 1.8.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit b729077710b14c75936909409e27a4fa0badcb54)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index 6eed8022..4577fef4 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -6929,7 +6929,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cl_str(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+ cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(id);
+ #else
+- struct connection *conn = objt_conn(smp->sess->origin);
++ struct connection *conn = __objt_conn(smp->sess->origin);
+ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(conn->xprt_ctx, bin);
+ #endif
+ str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
--- /dev/null
+commit 892c21240adb9ac230d4bd27cc8be4767b4902aa
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Mon Oct 15 13:20:07 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: ssl: fix another null-deref warning in ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk()
+
+ This null-deref cannot happen either as there necesarily is a listener
+ where this function is called. Let's use __objt_listener() to address
+ this.
+
+ This may be backported to 1.8.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit a8825520b785d592467c45e183ad8213cb7bf891)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index 4577fef4..cfbc38b7 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -2113,7 +2113,7 @@ static int ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *arg)
+ int i;
+
+ conn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_app_data_index);
+- s = objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf;
++ s = __objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf;
+
+ if (s->ssl_conf.early_data)
+ allow_early = 1;
--- /dev/null
+commit eb72c1faedc39c68fb1246ea8a97d1f96831756c
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Mon Oct 15 11:12:15 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: stick-table: make sure not to fail on task_new() during initialization
+
+ Gcc reports a potential null-deref error in the stick-table init code.
+ While not critical there, it's trivial to fix. This check has been
+ missing since 1.4 so this fix can be backported to all supported versions.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 848522f05df9e60eea9274e11f1e9fcd19594a5c)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/stick_table.c b/src/stick_table.c
+index 5a2f1295..653a1ffb 100644
+--- a/src/stick_table.c
++++ b/src/stick_table.c
+@@ -602,6 +602,8 @@ int stktable_init(struct stktable *t)
+ t->exp_next = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ if ( t->expire ) {
+ t->exp_task = task_new(MAX_THREADS_MASK);
++ if (!t->exp_task)
++ return 0;
+ t->exp_task->process = process_table_expire;
+ t->exp_task->context = (void *)t;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+commit d28afe3631e20a9fcca47efde031d62e501eff48
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Mon Oct 15 11:18:03 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: peers: check allocation error during peers_init_sync()
+
+ peers_init_sync() doesn't check task_new()'s return value and doesn't
+ return any result to indicate success or failure. Let's make it return
+ an int and check it from the caller.
+
+ This can be backported as far as 1.6.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit d944344f01d9ea914d94c45f6ac7c224c6143fc9)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/include/proto/peers.h b/include/proto/peers.h
+index 782b66e4..9d4aaff2 100644
+--- a/include/proto/peers.h
++++ b/include/proto/peers.h
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
+ #include <types/stream.h>
+ #include <types/peers.h>
+
+-void peers_init_sync(struct peers *peers);
++int peers_init_sync(struct peers *peers);
+ void peers_register_table(struct peers *, struct stktable *table);
+ void peers_setup_frontend(struct proxy *fe);
+
+diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
+index d1474d4b..7414b60d 100644
+--- a/src/cfgparse.c
++++ b/src/cfgparse.c
+@@ -9111,7 +9111,12 @@ out_uri_auth_compat:
+ curpeers->peers_fe = NULL;
+ }
+ else {
+- peers_init_sync(curpeers);
++ if (!peers_init_sync(curpeers)) {
++ ha_alert("Peers section '%s': out of memory, giving up on peers.\n",
++ curpeers->id);
++ cfgerr++;
++ break;
++ }
+ last = &curpeers->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/peers.c b/src/peers.c
+index c56ed3af..0cd56da3 100644
+--- a/src/peers.c
++++ b/src/peers.c
+@@ -2159,9 +2159,9 @@ static struct task *process_peer_sync(struct task * task)
+
+
+ /*
+- *
++ * returns 0 in case of error.
+ */
+-void peers_init_sync(struct peers *peers)
++int peers_init_sync(struct peers *peers)
+ {
+ struct peer * curpeer;
+ struct listener *listener;
+@@ -2173,10 +2173,14 @@ void peers_init_sync(struct peers *peers)
+ list_for_each_entry(listener, &peers->peers_fe->conf.listeners, by_fe)
+ listener->maxconn = peers->peers_fe->maxconn;
+ peers->sync_task = task_new(MAX_THREADS_MASK);
++ if (!peers->sync_task)
++ return 0;
++
+ peers->sync_task->process = process_peer_sync;
+ peers->sync_task->context = (void *)peers;
+ peers->sighandler = signal_register_task(0, peers->sync_task, 0);
+ task_wakeup(peers->sync_task, TASK_WOKEN_INIT);
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+
--- /dev/null
+commit c6eb147201c1d05afaadc5fd248b17be91f97331
+Author: Bertrand Jacquin <bertrand@jacquin.bzh>
+Date: Sat Oct 13 16:06:18 2018 +0100
+
+ DOC: Fix a few typos
+
+ these are mostly spelling mistakes, some of them might be candidate for
+ backporting as well.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit d5e4de8e5f99108e31dc7a23a0e91c4231e37974)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING b/CONTRIBUTING
+index b2c2b493..cd97e69b 100644
+--- a/CONTRIBUTING
++++ b/CONTRIBUTING
+@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ do not think about them anymore after a few patches.
+ A good rule of thumb is that if your identifiers start to contain more than
+ 3 words or more than 15 characters, they can become confusing. For function
+ names it's less important especially if these functions are rarely used or
+- are used in a complex context where it is important to differenciate between
++ are used in a complex context where it is important to differentiate between
+ their multiple variants.
+
+ 9) Unified diff only
+@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ do not think about them anymore after a few patches.
+ that you have committed your patch to a local branch, with an appropriate
+ subject line and a useful commit message explaining what the patch attempts
+ to do. It is not strictly required to use git, but what is strictly required
+- is to have all these elements in the same mail, easily distinguishible, and
++ is to have all these elements in the same mail, easily distinguishable, and
+ a patch in "diff -up" format (which is also the format used by Git). This
+ means the "unified" diff format must be used exclusively, and with the
+ function name printed in the diff header of each block. That significantly
+@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ sent to the mailing list : haproxy@formilux.org and CCed to relevant subsystem
+ maintainers or authors of the modified files if their address appears at the
+ top of the file.
+
+-Please don't send pull-requests, they are really unconvenient. First, a pull
++Please don't send pull-requests, they are really inconvenient. First, a pull
+ implies a merge operation and the code doesn't move fast enough to justify the
+ use of merges. Second, pull requests are not easily commented on by the
+ project's participants, contrary to e-mails where anyone is allowed to have an
+diff --git a/include/types/connection.h b/include/types/connection.h
+index 5e8af3e7..b9e46048 100644
+--- a/include/types/connection.h
++++ b/include/types/connection.h
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct server;
+ struct pipe;
+
+
+-/* A connection handle is how we differenciate two connections on the lower
++/* A connection handle is how we differentiate two connections on the lower
+ * layers. It usually is a file descriptor but can be a connection id.
+ */
+ union conn_handle {
--- /dev/null
+commit 75795017480da0f0a1157e945043249fe625f92f
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 16:11:56 2018 +0200
+
+ BUG/MEDIUM: threads: fix thread_release() at the end of the rendez-vous point
+
+ There is a bug in this function used to release other threads. It leaves
+ the current thread marked as harmless. If after this another thread does
+ a thread_isolate(), but before the first one reaches poll(), the second
+ thread will believe it's alone while it's not.
+
+ This must be backported to 1.8 since the rendez-vous point was merged
+ into 1.8.14.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit a9c0252b2e8ff7bb728b84d977ac6e9581ea12f8)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/hathreads.c b/src/hathreads.c
+index 9dba4356..0a7c12f7 100644
+--- a/src/hathreads.c
++++ b/src/hathreads.c
+@@ -221,12 +221,8 @@ void thread_isolate()
+ */
+ void thread_release()
+ {
+- while (1) {
+- HA_ATOMIC_AND(&threads_want_rdv_mask, ~tid_bit);
+- if (!(threads_want_rdv_mask & all_threads_mask))
+- break;
+- thread_harmless_till_end();
+- }
++ HA_ATOMIC_AND(&threads_want_rdv_mask, ~tid_bit);
++ thread_harmless_end();
+ }
+
+ __attribute__((constructor))
--- /dev/null
+commit 4805c249aabc45cd59386694f962e19ab50e8ca9
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 16:57:40 2018 +0200
+
+ BUG/MEDIUM: threads: make sure threads_want_sync is marked volatile
+
+ The threads_want_sync variable is not volatile, which allows the compiler
+ to cache old copies of it for long parts of code and possibly optimize
+ some tests away. This could result in deadlocks when using heavy queue
+ activity or health check state changes.
+
+ There is no upstream commit for this fix because the sync point was
+ completely removed from 1.9. This fix is exclusively for 1.8.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/hathreads.c b/src/hathreads.c
+index 0a7c12f7..730ebee4 100644
+--- a/src/hathreads.c
++++ b/src/hathreads.c
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ void thread_sync_io_handler(int fd)
+
+ static HA_SPINLOCK_T sync_lock;
+ static int threads_sync_pipe[2] = {-1, -1};
+-static unsigned long threads_want_sync = 0;
++volatile static unsigned long threads_want_sync = 0;
+ volatile unsigned long threads_want_rdv_mask = 0;
+ volatile unsigned long threads_harmless_mask = 0;
+ volatile unsigned long all_threads_mask = 1; // nbthread 1 assumed by default
--- /dev/null
+commit d26a40412197ba61a72368c71e8a8582d686d28c
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Mon Oct 15 11:53:34 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: compiler: add a new statement "__unreachable()"
+
+ This statement is used as a hint for the compiler so that it knows that
+ the location where it's placed cannot be reached. It will mostly be used
+ after longjmp() or equivalent statements that deal with error processing
+ and that the compiler doesn't know will not return on certain conditions,
+ so that it doesn't complain about null dereferences on error paths.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 8d26f02e693121764bfa0cb48c9a7ab31e17225d)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/include/common/compiler.h b/include/common/compiler.h
+index a13aad5c..6f4f5a67 100644
+--- a/include/common/compiler.h
++++ b/include/common/compiler.h
+@@ -82,6 +82,18 @@
+ */
+ #define __maybe_unused __attribute__((unused))
+
++/* This allows gcc to know that some locations are never reached, for example
++ * after a longjmp() in the Lua code, hence that some errors caught by such
++ * methods cannot propagate further. This is important with gcc versions 6 and
++ * above which can more aggressively detect null dereferences. The builtin
++ * below was introduced in gcc 4.5, and before it we didn't care.
++ */
++#if __GNUC__ >= 5 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5)
++#define __unreachable() __builtin_unreachable()
++#else
++#define __unreachable()
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Gcc >= 3 provides the ability for the programme to give hints to the
+ * compiler about what branch of an if is most likely to be taken. This
--- /dev/null
+commit 330e08dfc588dc9b0ad42203123fab6c191ca2f8
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 17:52:55 2018 +0200
+
+ MINOR: lua: all functions calling lua_yieldk() may return
+
+ There was a mistake when tagging functions which always use longjmp and
+ those which may use it in that all those supposed to call lua_yieldk()
+ may return without calling longjmp. Thus they must not use WILL_LJMP()
+ but MAY_LJMP(). It has zero impact on the code emitted as such, but
+ prevents other fixes from being properly implemented : this was the
+ cause of the previous failure with the __unreachable() calls.
+
+ This may be backported to older versions. It may or may not apply
+ well depending on the context, though the change simply consists in
+ replacing "WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk" with "MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk", and
+ same with the single call to lua_yieldk() in hlua_yieldk().
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 9635e03c41e95dff38731f67cc9d8b00e3731d2a)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c
+index 60ba94ea..64102e8a 100644
+--- a/src/hlua.c
++++ b/src/hlua.c
+@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ __LJMP void hlua_yieldk(lua_State *L, int nresults, int ctx,
+ hlua->flags |= flags;
+
+ /* Process the yield. */
+- WILL_LJMP(lua_yieldk(L, nresults, ctx, k));
++ MAY_LJMP(lua_yieldk(L, nresults, ctx, k));
+ }
+
+ /* This function initialises the Lua environment stored in the stream.
+@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ void hlua_hook(lua_State *L, lua_Debug *ar)
+ * If the state is not yieldable, trying yield causes an error.
+ */
+ if (lua_isyieldable(L))
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, NULL, TICK_ETERNITY, HLUA_CTRLYIELD));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, NULL, TICK_ETERNITY, HLUA_CTRLYIELD));
+
+ /* If we cannot yield, update the clock and check the timeout. */
+ tv_update_date(0, 1);
+@@ -1883,7 +1883,7 @@ connection_empty:
+ WILL_LJMP(luaL_error(L, "out of memory"));
+ }
+ xref_unlock(&socket->xref, peer);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_receive_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_receive_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -2082,7 +2082,7 @@ hlua_socket_write_yield_return:
+ WILL_LJMP(luaL_error(L, "out of memory"));
+ }
+ xref_unlock(&socket->xref, peer);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_write_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_write_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -2375,7 +2375,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_socket_connect_yield(struct lua_State *L, int status, lua
+ WILL_LJMP(luaL_error(L, "out of memory error"));
+ }
+ xref_unlock(&socket->xref, peer);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_connect_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_connect_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -2493,7 +2493,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_socket_connect(struct lua_State *L)
+ task_wakeup(s->task, TASK_WOKEN_INIT);
+ /* Return yield waiting for connection. */
+
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_connect_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_socket_connect_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -2819,7 +2819,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_dup_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext
+ chn = MAY_LJMP(hlua_checkchannel(L, 1));
+
+ if (_hlua_channel_dup(chn, L) == 0)
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_dup_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_dup_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -2845,7 +2845,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_get_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext
+
+ ret = _hlua_channel_dup(chn, L);
+ if (unlikely(ret == 0))
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_get_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_get_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+
+ if (unlikely(ret == -1))
+ return 1;
+@@ -2883,7 +2883,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_getline_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCont
+
+ ret = ci_getline_nc(chn, &blk1, &len1, &blk2, &len2);
+ if (ret == 0)
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_getline_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_getline_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ lua_pushnil(L);
+@@ -2932,7 +2932,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_append_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KConte
+ */
+ if (chn->buf->size == 0) {
+ si_applet_cant_put(chn_prod(chn));
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_append_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_append_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ max = channel_recv_limit(chn) - buffer_len(chn->buf);
+@@ -2946,7 +2946,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_append_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KConte
+ }
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ chn->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_append_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_append_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+ l += ret;
+ lua_pop(L, 1);
+@@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_append_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KConte
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (l < len)
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_append_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_append_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -3026,7 +3026,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_send_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext
+ */
+ if (chn->buf->size == 0) {
+ si_applet_cant_put(chn_prod(chn));
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_send_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_send_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* the writed data will be immediatly sent, so we can check
+@@ -3082,7 +3082,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_send_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext
+ HLUA_SET_WAKERESWR(hlua);
+ else
+ HLUA_SET_WAKEREQWR(hlua);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_send_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_send_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+@@ -3146,7 +3146,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_channel_forward_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCont
+ HLUA_SET_WAKEREQWR(hlua);
+
+ /* Otherwise, we can yield waiting for new data in the inpout side. */
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_forward_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_channel_forward_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+@@ -3654,7 +3654,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_tcp_getline_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KC
+ /* Data not yet avalaible. return yield. */
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ si_applet_cant_get(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_getline_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_getline_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* End of data: commit the total strings and return. */
+@@ -3709,7 +3709,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCont
+ /* Data not yet avalaible. return yield. */
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ si_applet_cant_get(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* End of data: commit the total strings and return. */
+@@ -3732,7 +3732,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCont
+ luaL_addlstring(&appctx->b, blk2, len2);
+ co_skip(si_oc(si), len1 + len2);
+ si_applet_cant_get(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+
+ } else {
+
+@@ -3756,7 +3756,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCont
+ lua_pushinteger(L, len);
+ lua_replace(L, 2);
+ si_applet_cant_get(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* return the result. */
+@@ -3825,7 +3825,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_tcp_send_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCont
+ */
+ if (l < len) {
+ si_applet_cant_put(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_send_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_tcp_send_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+@@ -4122,7 +4122,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_http_getline_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_K
+ */
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ si_applet_cant_put(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_getline_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_getline_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+ appctx->appctx->ctx.hlua_apphttp.flags &= ~APPLET_100C;
+ }
+@@ -4139,7 +4139,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_http_getline_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_K
+ /* Data not yet avalaible. return yield. */
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ si_applet_cant_get(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_getline_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_getline_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* End of data: commit the total strings and return. */
+@@ -4208,7 +4208,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_http_recv_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCon
+ */
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ si_applet_cant_put(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+ appctx->appctx->ctx.hlua_apphttp.flags &= ~APPLET_100C;
+ }
+@@ -4219,7 +4219,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_http_recv_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCon
+ /* Data not yet avalaible. return yield. */
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ si_applet_cant_get(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* End of data: commit the total strings and return. */
+@@ -4254,7 +4254,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_http_recv_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCon
+ lua_pushinteger(L, len);
+ lua_replace(L, 2);
+ si_applet_cant_get(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_recv_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* return the result. */
+@@ -4320,7 +4320,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_http_send_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KCon
+ */
+ if (l < len) {
+ si_applet_cant_put(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_send_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_send_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+@@ -4460,7 +4460,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_applet_http_start_response_yield(lua_State *L, int status
+ /* If ret is -1, we dont have room in the buffer, so we yield. */
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ si_applet_cant_put(si);
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_start_response_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_applet_http_start_response_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* Headers sent, set the flag. */
+@@ -5510,7 +5510,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_sleep_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext ctx)
+ {
+ int wakeup_ms = lua_tointeger(L, -1);
+ if (now_ms < wakeup_ms)
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_sleep_yield, wakeup_ms, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_sleep_yield, wakeup_ms, 0));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -5525,7 +5525,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_sleep(lua_State *L)
+ wakeup_ms = tick_add(now_ms, delay);
+ lua_pushinteger(L, wakeup_ms);
+
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_sleep_yield, wakeup_ms, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_sleep_yield, wakeup_ms, 0));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -5540,7 +5540,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_msleep(lua_State *L)
+ wakeup_ms = tick_add(now_ms, delay);
+ lua_pushinteger(L, wakeup_ms);
+
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_sleep_yield, wakeup_ms, 0));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_sleep_yield, wakeup_ms, 0));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -5555,7 +5555,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_yield_yield(lua_State *L, int status, lua_KContext ctx)
+
+ __LJMP static int hlua_yield(lua_State *L)
+ {
+- WILL_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_yield_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, HLUA_CTRLYIELD));
++ MAY_LJMP(hlua_yieldk(L, 0, 0, hlua_yield_yield, TICK_ETERNITY, HLUA_CTRLYIELD));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+commit 8019e88dd1ac73a3baa71e9acfbc1b7a3fbc7442
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 17:37:12 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: lua: silence some compiler warnings about potential null derefs (#2)
+
+ Here we make sure that appctx is always taken from the unchecked value
+ since we know it's an appctx, which explains why it's immediately
+ dereferenced. A missing test was added to ensure that task_new() does
+ not return a NULL.
+
+ This may be backported to 1.8.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit e09101e8d92b0c0ef8674fbc791e309112ab7f1c)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c
+index 64102e8a..ad9238ef 100644
+--- a/src/hlua.c
++++ b/src/hlua.c
+@@ -2361,7 +2361,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_socket_connect_yield(struct lua_State *L, int status, lua
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+- appctx = objt_appctx(s->si[0].end);
++ appctx = __objt_appctx(s->si[0].end);
+
+ /* Check for connection established. */
+ if (appctx->ctx.hlua_cosocket.connected) {
+@@ -2473,7 +2473,7 @@ __LJMP static int hlua_socket_connect(struct lua_State *L)
+ }
+
+ hlua = hlua_gethlua(L);
+- appctx = objt_appctx(s->si[0].end);
++ appctx = __objt_appctx(s->si[0].end);
+
+ /* inform the stream that we want to be notified whenever the
+ * connection completes.
+@@ -5693,6 +5693,9 @@ static int hlua_register_task(lua_State *L)
+ WILL_LJMP(luaL_error(L, "lua out of memory error."));
+
+ task = task_new(MAX_THREADS_MASK);
++ if (!task)
++ WILL_LJMP(luaL_error(L, "Lua out of memory error."));
++
+ task->context = hlua;
+ task->process = hlua_process_task;
+
--- /dev/null
+commit 3f39e1d4b5ca37e57247034421c69bc301d996b2
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 17:57:36 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: lua: silence some compiler warnings after WILL_LJMP
+
+ These ones are on error paths that are properly handled by luaL_error()
+ which does a longjmp() but the compiler cannot know it. By adding an
+ __unreachable() statement in WILL_LJMP(), there is no ambiguity anymore.
+
+ This may be backported to 1.8 but these previous patches are needed first :
+ - BUILD: compiler: add a new statement "__unreachable()"
+ - MINOR: lua: all functions calling lua_yieldk() may return
+ - BUILD: lua: silence some compiler warnings about potential null derefs (#2)
+
+ (cherry picked from commit b059b894cdf795f134b6e53ff95ea7f907feb846)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/hlua.c b/src/hlua.c
+index ad9238ef..c3bb269a 100644
+--- a/src/hlua.c
++++ b/src/hlua.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <ebpttree.h>
+
+ #include <common/cfgparse.h>
++#include <common/compiler.h>
+ #include <common/xref.h>
+ #include <common/hathreads.h>
+
+@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@
+ * MAY_LJMP() marks an lua function that may use longjmp.
+ */
+ #define __LJMP
+-#define WILL_LJMP(func) func
++#define WILL_LJMP(func) do { func; __unreachable(); } while(0)
+ #define MAY_LJMP(func) func
+
+ /* This couple of function executes securely some Lua calls outside of
--- /dev/null
+commit b884ba5222a765b395e8ac93971639a0452d6422
+Author: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri Sep 14 14:31:22 2018 +0200
+
+ CLEANUP: stick-tables: Remove unneeded double (()) around conditional clause
+
+ In the past this conditional had multiple conditionals which is why the
+ additional parentheses were needed. The conditional was simplified but
+ the duplicate parentheses were not cleaned up.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit ff57f1bbcf8af1e6389520aa845df5aa97ef55b6)
+ [wt: fixes build warnings with clang]
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/stick_table.c b/src/stick_table.c
+index 653a1ffb..f1442603 100644
+--- a/src/stick_table.c
++++ b/src/stick_table.c
+@@ -1860,7 +1860,7 @@ smp_fetch_sc_tracked(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw,
+ smp->data.u.sint = !!stkctr;
+
+ /* release the ref count */
+- if ((stkctr == &tmpstkctr))
++ if (stkctr == &tmpstkctr)
+ stktable_release(stkctr->table, stkctr_entry(stkctr));
+
+ return 1;
--- /dev/null
+commit 0820ab24974cd2bad84c8ec5a90f7ce0e1681cf0
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Wed Oct 3 09:40:22 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: Makefile: add a "make opts" target to simply show the build options
+
+ We're often missing an easy way to map input variables to output ones.
+ The "opts" build target will simply show the input variables and the ones
+ passed to the compiler and linker. This way it's easier to quickly see
+ what a given build script or package will use, or the detected warnings
+ supported by the compiler.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit a8b12c6bb73b924f6429c3ae4d20b96992e92c2e)
+ [wt: this is not needed but significantly helps for packaging]
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index 5d170041..d3615060 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -996,3 +996,20 @@ update-version:
+ echo "$(VERSION)" > VERSION
+ echo "$(SUBVERS)" > SUBVERS
+ echo "$(VERDATE)" > VERDATE
++
++# just display the build options
++opts:
++ @echo -n 'Using: '
++ @echo -n 'TARGET="$(strip $(TARGET))" '
++ @echo -n 'ARCH="$(strip $(ARCH))" '
++ @echo -n 'CPU="$(strip $(CPU))" '
++ @echo -n 'CC="$(strip $(CC))" '
++ @echo -n 'ARCH_FLAGS="$(strip $(ARCH_FLAGS))" '
++ @echo -n 'CPU_CFLAGS="$(strip $(CPU_CFLAGS))" '
++ @echo -n 'DEBUG_CFLAGS="$(strip $(DEBUG_CFLAGS))" '
++ @echo "$(strip $(BUILD_OPTIONS))"
++ @echo 'COPTS="$(strip $(COPTS))"'
++ @echo 'LDFLAGS="$(strip $(LDFLAGS))"'
++ @echo 'LDOPTS="$(strip $(LDOPTS))"'
++ @echo 'OPTIONS_OBJS="$(strip $(OPTIONS_OBJS))"'
++ @echo 'OBJS="$(strip $(OBJS))"'
--- /dev/null
+commit 5df1480da4c4e58830d108f4f0f3347598c55ab3
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Wed Oct 3 09:52:51 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: Makefile: speed up compiler options detection
+
+ Commits b78016649 and d3a7f4035 brought the ability to detect the build
+ options and warnings that the compiler supports. However, they're detected
+ using "$(CC) -c", which is 50% slower than "$(CC) -E" for the same result,
+ just because it starts the assembler at the end. Given that we're starting
+ to check for a number of warnings, this detection alone starts to become
+ visible, taking a bit more than 300 ms on the build time. Let's switch to
+ -E instead to shrink this incompressible time by roughly 100 ms.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit f11ca5e7a43c772637018ec2ad981a9fd7d3816f)
+ [wt: only backported for context and consistency with next patch]
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index d3615060..1a971f92 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -96,13 +96,13 @@
+ # Usage: CFLAGS += $(call cc-opt,option). Eg: $(call cc-opt,-fwrapv)
+ # Note: ensure the referencing variable is assigned using ":=" and not "=" to
+ # call it only once.
+-cc-opt = $(shell set -e; if $(CC) $(1) -c -xc - -o /dev/null </dev/null >&0 2>&0; then echo "$(1)"; fi;)
++cc-opt = $(shell set -e; if $(CC) $(1) -E -xc - -o /dev/null </dev/null >&0 2>&0; then echo "$(1)"; fi;)
+
+ # Disable a warning when supported by the compiler. Don't put spaces around the
+ # warning! And don't use cc-opt which doesn't always report an error until
+ # another one is also returned.
+ # Usage: CFLAGS += $(call cc-nowarn,warning). Eg: $(call cc-opt,format-truncation)
+-cc-nowarn = $(shell set -e; if $(CC) -W$(1) -c -xc - -o /dev/null </dev/null >&0 2>&0; then echo "-Wno-$(1)"; fi;)
++cc-nowarn = $(shell set -e; if $(CC) -W$(1) -E -xc - -o /dev/null </dev/null >&0 2>&0; then echo "-Wno-$(1)"; fi;)
+
+ #### Installation options.
+ DESTDIR =
--- /dev/null
+commit a7e9853db925b12b1d040be8b04bafc11d84d685
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 18:11:34 2018 +0200
+
+ BUILD: Makefile: silence an option conflict warning with clang
+
+ clang complains that -fno-strict-overflow is not used when -fwrapv is
+ used, which breaks the build when -Werror is used. Let's introduce a
+ cc-opt-alt function to emit the former only then the latter is not
+ supported (since it implies the former).
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 0d7a2ae4f5199ec37ead6914fa24d40ec0989a4d)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index 1a971f92..6ffc1b06 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@
+ # call it only once.
+ cc-opt = $(shell set -e; if $(CC) $(1) -E -xc - -o /dev/null </dev/null >&0 2>&0; then echo "$(1)"; fi;)
+
++# same but emits $2 if $1 is not supported
++cc-opt-alt = $(shell set -e; if $(CC) $(1) -E -xc - -o /dev/null </dev/null >&0 2>&0; then echo "$(1)"; else echo "$(2)"; fi;)
++
+ # Disable a warning when supported by the compiler. Don't put spaces around the
+ # warning! And don't use cc-opt which doesn't always report an error until
+ # another one is also returned.
+@@ -147,8 +150,7 @@ DEBUG_CFLAGS = -g
+ # can do whatever it wants since it's an undefined behavior, so use -fwrapv
+ # to be sure we get the intended behavior.
+ SPEC_CFLAGS := -fno-strict-aliasing -Wdeclaration-after-statement
+-SPEC_CFLAGS += $(call cc-opt,-fwrapv)
+-SPEC_CFLAGS += $(call cc-opt,-fno-strict-overflow)
++SPEC_CFLAGS += $(call cc-opt-alt,-fwrapv,$(call cc-opt,-fno-strict-overflow))
+ SPEC_CFLAGS += $(call cc-nowarn,format-truncation)
+ SPEC_CFLAGS += $(call cc-nowarn,address-of-packed-member)
+ SPEC_CFLAGS += $(call cc-nowarn,null-dereference)
--- /dev/null
+commit 541e3b40b394fb6bde563ff8ce4c882dafca4eb1
+Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 18:35:01 2018 +0200
+
+ MINOR: server: Use memcpy() instead of strncpy().
+
+ Use memcpy instead of strncpy, strncpy buys us nothing, and gcc is being
+ annoying.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 17f8b90736d811ac9a04af198a3aee34e9935cec)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
+index 4941bd03..208f21da 100644
+--- a/src/server.c
++++ b/src/server.c
+@@ -3078,7 +3078,7 @@ void apply_server_state(void)
+ globalfilepathlen = 0;
+ goto globalfileerror;
+ }
+- strncpy(globalfilepath, global.server_state_base, len);
++ memcpy(globalfilepath, global.server_state_base, len);
+ globalfilepath[globalfilepathlen] = 0;
+
+ /* append a slash if needed */
+@@ -3147,7 +3147,7 @@ void apply_server_state(void)
+ localfilepathlen = 0;
+ goto localfileerror;
+ }
+- strncpy(localfilepath, global.server_state_base, len);
++ memcpy(localfilepath, global.server_state_base, len);
+ localfilepath[localfilepathlen] = 0;
+
+ /* append a slash if needed */
--- /dev/null
+commit 1993e23d59e37ee7befbc64bf1535640a16354bc
+Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 18:39:38 2018 +0200
+
+ MINOR: cfgparse: Write 130 as 128 as 0x82 and 0x80.
+
+ Write 130 and 128 as 8x82 and 0x80, to avoid warnings about casting from
+ int to size. "check_req" should probably be unsigned, but it's hard to do so.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 3332090a2d3e9e84bac67af79fb03be111359429)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
+index 7414b60d..87a4d803 100644
+--- a/src/cfgparse.c
++++ b/src/cfgparse.c
+@@ -5082,7 +5082,7 @@ stats_error_parsing:
+ ((unsigned char) (packetlen >> 16) & 0xff));
+
+ curproxy->check_req[3] = 1;
+- curproxy->check_req[5] = 130;
++ curproxy->check_req[5] = 0x82; // 130
+ curproxy->check_req[11] = 1;
+ curproxy->check_req[12] = 33;
+ memcpy(&curproxy->check_req[36], mysqluser, userlen);
+@@ -5108,7 +5108,7 @@ stats_error_parsing:
+ ((unsigned char) (packetlen >> 16) & 0xff));
+
+ curproxy->check_req[3] = 1;
+- curproxy->check_req[5] = 128;
++ curproxy->check_req[5] = 0x80;
+ curproxy->check_req[8] = 1;
+ memcpy(&curproxy->check_req[9], mysqluser, userlen);
+ curproxy->check_req[9 + userlen + 1 + 1] = 1;
--- /dev/null
+commit 0d31b8e1dae2bd0ad73c90748a03f9cfeed837d8
+Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 18:49:26 2018 +0200
+
+ MINOR: peers: use defines instead of enums to appease clang.
+
+ Clang (rightfully) warns that we're trying to set chars to values >= 128.
+ Use defines with hex values instead of an enum to address this.
+
+ (cherry picked from commit 33992267aac00d7e8ae67e0703bf7fffc9cf9b54)
+ Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+diff --git a/src/peers.c b/src/peers.c
+index 0cd56da3..465ffe85 100644
+--- a/src/peers.c
++++ b/src/peers.c
+@@ -122,15 +122,13 @@ enum {
+ /* Note: ids >= 128 contains */
+ /* id message cotains data */
+ /*******************************/
+-enum {
+- PEER_MSG_STKT_UPDATE = 128,
+- PEER_MSG_STKT_INCUPDATE,
+- PEER_MSG_STKT_DEFINE,
+- PEER_MSG_STKT_SWITCH,
+- PEER_MSG_STKT_ACK,
+- PEER_MSG_STKT_UPDATE_TIMED,
+- PEER_MSG_STKT_INCUPDATE_TIMED,
+-};
++#define PEER_MSG_STKT_UPDATE 0x80
++#define PEER_MSG_STKT_INCUPDATE 0x81
++#define PEER_MSG_STKT_DEFINE 0x82
++#define PEER_MSG_STKT_SWITCH 0x83
++#define PEER_MSG_STKT_ACK 0x84
++#define PEER_MSG_STKT_UPDATE_TIMED 0x85
++#define PEER_MSG_STKT_INCUPDATE_TIMED 0x86
+
+ /**********************************/
+ /* Peer Session IO handler states */
git.99rst.org / openwrt-packages.git / commitdiff